

# "WITH or WITHOUT the BROTHERS"

Domestic, Regional, and International

Trends in Islamism (2013-2015)



Venue: CERI/Sciences Po

56, rue Jacob 75006 Paris

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WHEN AUTHORITARIANISM  
FAILS IN THE ARAB WORLD

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## **Social sciences to make sense of the phasing out of authoritarianism in the Arab world**

Financed by the European Research Council (advanced grant 2013-2017), the WFAFW project aims at mobilizing the methods and concepts of the social sciences, adapting them if necessary, to analyse the profound changes initiated by the “Arab Spring”. As project investigator, François Burgat selected a multidisciplinary team of researchers, all with command of Arabic and in direct contact with the field. The programme is managed from the Institut de recherches et d'études sur le monde arabe et musulman (IREMAM), based in Aix-en-Provence. In addition to the team of “core-researchers”, the WFAFW project has recruited six “post-doctoral” researchers, is funding three doctoral fellowships and helping a great number of other researchers on the field. Academic meetings have been organized in the framework of WFAFW in Tunis, Amman, Beirut, Ankara, Rome, Aix-en-Provence and Paris. A wide range of articles, reports, op-eds and books have been published by the team or are in preparation.

Since December 2010, waves of protests stemming from Arab societies have opened the possibility to seriously envision the phasing out of the autocratic period that has characterized the region for so long. Protests have affected domestic and international political dynamics (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain), and some other by anticipation (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Palestine) – and they continue to do so. Phenomena of apparent authoritarian resilience are triggering tremendous violence, highlighting yet other types of failure of authoritarianism. In each country, the acceleration of history has generated new practices, given birth to new actors who operate in coalitions and dramatically reconfigured socio-political alliances. These changes in the national political arenas, unsurprisingly, contribute to the reshaping of the regional political equilibrium.

Events over the last five years have confirmed the relevance of the different hypotheses and problematics that the research team members have developed in their past work – namely the issues of structural changes affecting political scenes, the gradual shifts in Euro-Mediterranean relations, and especially the centrality of Islamist movements in the post-2011 configurations. The project is characterized in particular by a desire to analyze current events in the light of ongoing discussions surrounding the interpretation of Islamism and its relationship to authoritarianism on the one hand and the different dynamics of political modernization on the other.

# WITH OR WITHOUT THE BROTHERS

## Domestic, Regional, and International Trends in Islamism (2013-2015)

Over the last years, politics in the Middle East and North Africa have been shaped by impressive reversals of fortune. Month after month, journalists and analysts have all at some point depicted liberals, Islamists, soldiers, women, jihadis, and youth as the great winners of the “Arab spring”, before being later considered as likely losers. The root causes of the Muslim Brotherhood’s inability, since the fall of Muhammad Mursi in Egypt, during the second “round” of the Arab Spring, to cash in on the political capital originally accumulated thanks to their leading role in the opposition to authoritarian regimes and subsequently during post-revolutionary elections, still calls for substantial research. In parallel, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State has been a game changer, introducing new dynamics that need to be made explicit and analysed by academics.

Far from meaning the end of political Islam, the Brothers’ setback is having lasting effects on the Islamist field. The object of this conference, organised by the WFAW program in partnership with CERI/Sciences Po, IREMAM, IFPO, and Oslo University, is to look into the resilience of the Muslim Brotherhood despite its apparent marginalization and meanwhile how Salafi and Jihadi groups have too been affected by the developments that occurred after the Egyptian military coup of July 2013 and the establishment of the Islamic State in June 2014.

The objects of the conference are multiple: to complete the study of the mechanisms generating “disillusionment with the Brothers”, and to better gauge the phenomenon’s importance. We aim to understand what has become of the “survivors” of the Muslim Brotherhood’s and of those Islamists who distanced themselves from the Brothers, often criticizing the concessions made by the latter while in power.

The downfall of the Muslim Brothers since the Egyptian military coup is a far cry from having seriously damaged Sunni Islamism as a whole. It is no doubt possible that certain disillusioned Brothers may have called into question the “Islamist” dimension of their political commitment. It is however well established that a part of the “disillusioned”, whose numbers have yet to be quantified, have become even more radically “re-islamised” as of then. The path to radicalization and violence which they tend to follow leads them to walk in the footsteps of their “Jihadi” predecessors towards a rupture with the doctrinal accommodations which has enabled the Brothers to produce a pattern of “Islamic” recognition of democratic process.



Over and beyond the deliberately depoliticized Salafi fringe, the importance of the concessions made by the Brothers in view of the necessities of being in office, when compared with their paltry gains, may well favour a significant shift in mobilizable resources playing into the hands of their direct historical challengers, i.e. of the Salafi, and/or further still afield, in terms of oppositional resources, of the jihadis themselves whether from the al-Qaeda generation or the one pledging allegiance to the Islamic State.

The conference is structured around a set of issues. The five successive panels will focus on 1) exploring the effects of political marginalization and repression of Islamists on their relationship to violence, 2) investigating the level of resilience of Muslim Brotherhood networks after 2013 in Egypt and beyond, 3) understanding the way Iraqi and Syrian dynamics have restructured jihadi movements, 4) studying the effects of the emergence of the Islamic State on intra-jihadi rivalries, 5) examining the reconfigurations of the broad Islamist field.

*Conference academic organizing committee:*

**Laurent BONNEFOY, François BURGAT, Stéphane LACROIX and Bjorn Olav UTVIK.**

# CONFERENCE PROGRAM

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**Thursday 29th of October, 2015**

**9:30-9:45** Opening address by **Alain DIECKHOFF**, director of the *Centre de recherches internationales* (CERI/Sciences Po)

**9:45-10:30** Keynote address by **François BURGAT** (WFAW, IREMAM)  
From Ghannouchi to al-Baghdadi: The ubiquitous diversity of the Islamic lexicon

**10:30-13:15** **Panel 1: Linking political exclusion to violence?**

Chair: Loulouwa AL-RACHID (WFAW, CERI/Sciences Po)

- **Sari HANAFI** (WFAW, American University of Beirut)  
Transnational movement of Islamic reform: New configurations
- **Bjorn Olav UTVIK** (Oslo University)  
Myths of Ikhwan disaster: Anatomy of the 2011-2013 power struggle in Egypt
- **Amal-Fatiha ABBASSI** (IREMAM, PhD candidate at Sciences Po Aix)  
The Muslim Brotherhood and political disengagement. The consequences of an authoritarian situation

*11:45-12:00 Coffee break*

- **Monica MARKS** (WFAW, PhD candidate at Oxford University)  
Survivalist club or dynamic movement? Generational politics in Ennahda today
- **Joas WAGEMAKERS** (Utrecht University)  
With or without the others: Consolidating divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (2013-2015)
- **Amel BOUBEKEUR** (SWP, Berlin)  
Algerian Islamists and Salafis after the Arab Spring: Eroding or reloading the regime?

**14:30-16:45 Panel 2: A Resilient Muslim Brotherhood?**

Chair: Stéphane LACROIX (WFAFW, CERI/Sciences Po)

- **Rory MCCARTHY** (PhD candidate at Oxford University)  
When Islamists lose an election
- **Marc LYNCH** (George Washington University)  
Evolving transnational networks and media strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood
- **Marie VANNETZEL** (WFAFW, CURAPP)  
#R4bia: The dynamics of the pro-Mursi mobilizations in Turkey
- **Dilek YANKAYA** (WFAFW, IREMAM)  
A “transnational Islamic business network”? Rethinking the connections between Turkish, Egyptian and Tunisian “Islamic businessmen” after the Arab Springs

**16:45-17:00** Coffee break

**17:00-17:45** Open discussion on contemporary Muslim Brotherhood dynamics

**Friday 30th of October, 2015**

**9:30-11:30 Panel 3: The Iraqi/Syrian matrix of violence**

Chair: Bjorn Olav UTVIK (Oslo University)

- **Loulouwa AL-RACHID** (WAWAW, CERI/Sciences Po)  
The Disarray of Iraqi Sunnis
- **Truls TONNESEN** (FFI Oslo)  
The Iraqi origins of the “Islamic State”
- **Yahya MICHOT** (Hartford Seminary)  
Ibn Taymiyya in ‘Dabiq’
- **Thomas PIERRET** (Edinburgh University)  
*Farewell to the vanguard: Syria’s Ahrar al-Sham Islamic movement and wartime de-radicalisation*
- **Tine GADE** (Oslo University)  
Sunnism in Lebanon after the Syrian war

**11:30-11:45** Coffee break

**11:45-13:30 Panel 4: Al-Qaeda vs. the Islamic State**

Chair: François BURGAT (WAWAW, IREMAM)

- **Hasan ABU HANIEH** (Independent researcher)  
*New Jihadism: From harassment to empowerment* (In Arabic)
- **Brynjar LIA** (Oslo University)  
The jihadi movement and rebel governance: A reassertion of a patriarchal order?
- **Saud AL-SARHAN** (King Faysal Foundation)  
The Islamic State in Saudi Arabia
- **Abdulsalam AL-RUBAIDI** (Al-Baidha University)  
*Ansar al-Sharia in South Yemen: configuration, expansion and discourse* (In Arabic)
- **Ismail ALEXANDRANI** (Independent researcher)  
Sinai with and without the Brothers: did it matter?



**14:30-16:45** **Panel 5: Muslim Brothers and their Islamist competitors**

Chair: Sari HANAFI (WAWAW, American University of Beirut)

- **Muhammad ABU RUMMAN** (Jordanian University)  
*Dilemmas in Salafi dynamics in the wake of the Arab democratic revolutions (In Arabic)*
- **Stéphane LACROIX** (WAWAW, CERJ/Sciences Po)  
Being Salafi under Sisi: Examining the post-coup strategy of the al-Nour party
- **Ahmed ZAGHLUL** (CEDEJ, Cairo)  
*The nationalization of the religious sphere in Egypt (In Arabic)*
- **Myriam BENRAAD** (IREMAM)  
Iraqi Muslim Brothers: Between the Islamic State and a hard place
- **Nicolas DOT-POUILLARD** (WAWAW, IFPO)  
Hizbullah and Muslims Brothers: A political rupture or a contract renegotiation?
- **Laurent BONNEFOY** (WAWAW, CERJ/Sciences Po)  
Islahis, Salafis, Huthis: reconfigurations of the Islamist field in war torn Yemen

**16:45-17:00** Coffee break

**17:00-18:00** Concluding remarks and discussion with **François BURGAT** (WAWAW, IREMAM) and **Bernard ROUGIER** (Paris III University).



## ABSTRACTS

**Amal-Fatiha ABBASSI**

### ***The Muslim Brotherhood and political disengagement. The consequences of an authoritarian situation***

The paper looks into the developments that occurred inside the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) since the 3 July 2013 *coup d'état*. It analyses the impact of the *Raba'a Al-'adaweya* sit-in's dispersal in August 2013 and the labelling of the MB as a terrorist organization on this movement's organization and on Egyptian politics. It looks at two different levels: first, at the organizational level, it shows how the MB's leaders and activists were faced with the development of an ideological conflict and internal crisis. The typology of members' trajectories allows us to grasp the changes and re-composition that affected them. The second level concentrates on the national politics and in particular looks at the "eviction" of the MB from the Egyptian political scene and its impact on the movement. It also highlights the attempt by the Salafi movement to replace the MB in the religious-political arena and raises the questions: Is a policy of "domestication" of the Egyptian religious field being applied by the new government?

**Hasan ABU HANIEH**

### ***New Jihadism: From harassment to empowerment (In Arabic)***

#### **الجهادية الجديدة من النكاية إلى التمكين**

بعد ربيع عربي قصير برز نهج جهادي جديد يتجاوز النماذج الجهادية التقليدية، التي تتمثل بنمط الجهاد التضامني ونمط الجهاد النكائي، ففي الوقت الذي أصر فيه تنظيم القاعدة المركزي على المضي قدما في مناكفة العدو البعيد عبر تكتيكات حروب النكاية، ونهج الاستنزاف والمطاول، كان تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية يقدم نموذجا جديدا يستند إلى أولوية قتال العدو القريب عبر استراتيجيات التمكين، ونهج التطهير والسيطرة والمنازلة، حيث شدد على كونه طليعة محاربة ممثلة للأمة الإسلامية، تقاوم الأنظمة باعتبارها «مرتدة» ومرتبطة بالغرب، وتسعى لحرمانها وحلفائها من الاستقرار والسيطرة، وتتبنى نهج «حروب الهوية» على أسس دينية مذهبية، دون الالتفات إلى سياسة حرب الأنصار التقليدية، بل على فرض السيطرة والتطهير المكاني وإخضاع الخصوم واستلام زمام الحكامة كسلطة متغلبة في مناخ من الفوضى والتوحش.

سوف نقوم في هذه الورقة بالتعرف على النمط الجهادي الجديد الذي جسده تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، وتتبع خريطة الولايات الخارجية لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، ومناطق انتشارها في العالمين العربي والإسلامي، باعتبارها تجسيدا لجاذبية التمط الجهادي الجديد، وتطبيقا عمليا لجهاد التمكين وتحقيقا لشعار التنظيم الأشهر «باقية وتتمدد»، إذ لم يعد الشعار مجرد حلم بعيد المنال، فقد تواترت عملية تأسيس ولايات خارجية تتبع الدولة الإسلامية في مختلف أرجاء العالم الإسلامي، وتمكن التنظيم من الحصول على ثقة جماعات جهادية محلية عديدة، حيث تلقى بيعات الانضمام إلى خلافته والامتثال لأوامره، وباتت ولاياته تمتد خارج مركزه في العراق وسوريا إلى بلدان عربية وإسلامية عديدة.

After a short "Arab spring" phase, a new jihadi trend has appeared and overtaken the previously known trends, representing both the "solidarity" and "vengeance" jihads. At a time when the central al-Qaeda organisation insisted on fighting the "far enemy" through the tactics of harassment war, and an approach based on attrition and rivalry, the organization of the Islamic State has offered a new model. It is based on the priority given to fighting the "near enemy", through empowerment strategies, as well as an approach of cleansing, control and confrontation. It has focused on being the exemplary vanguard of the defense of the Islamic nation, fighting regimes considered apostates and linked to the West, seeking to deprive communities and their international allies of stability and sovereignty. It has adopted an «identity wars» approach based on religious and sectarian grounds, no longer paying attention to traditional guerrilla warfare policies but rather imposing control and spatial cleansing and subduing opponents to impose itself as a governing power in a climate of chaos and savagery.

In this paper we shall identify the new jihadi style which is embodied by the Islamic State, surveying its areas of deployment in both the Arab and Muslim worlds. We consider that it represents the attractiveness of the new jihadi model, and the practical application of jihad empowerment and the realization of the famous slogan "to stay and to expend". This slogan happens to no longer be only a long term dream as the process of creating constituencies related to the Islamic State has accelerated in various places of the Muslim world. The organization has been able to gain the trust of many local jihadi groups. It has received the allegiance of many groups who obey its orders and its power keeps expanding outside its center in Iraq and Syria to many Arab and Muslim countries.

**Muhammad ABU RUMAN**

## ***Dilemmas in Salafi dynamics in the wake of the Arab democratic revolutions (In Arabic)***

### **معضلات التحولات السلفية في لحظة الثورات الديمقراطية العربية**

داهمت الثورات الشعبية العربية (في بداياتها) الحركات والاتجاهات السلفية (المنتشرة على رقعة الجغرافيا العربية) كما فاجأت الأنظمة نفسها، فالسلفيون عموماً لم يكونوا مستعدين ولا متوقعين لتلك اللحظة التي تختلف فيها الحسابات السياسية وتنقلب رأساً على عقب، بسبب عبور قطار الثورات الديمقراطية على المسار العربي، وهم الذين وطنوا أنفسهم منذ قرون فقهيًا وأيديولوجيًا على أن الأنظمة دوماً هي المنتصرة أو أن التغيير السلمي الديمقراطي ليس مطروحاً في عالمنا، لذلك لم تكن تلك اللحظة مطروحة حتى على الصعيد النظري الأيديولوجي لدى أغلب الاتجاهات السلفية.

في هذه الورقة سنحاول الاقتراب من التيارات السلفية السلمية (ونستبعد السلفية الجهادية) سواء تلك التي أمنت بالعمل السياسي مسبقاً، لكنها لم تعلن القبول بالديمقراطية صراحة، أو تلك التي ابتعدت عن السياسة واعتبرتها عملاً غير مفيد، وسنسعى إلى قراءة التغييرات الأيديولوجية التي طرأت على خطاب تلك الجماعات والاتجاهات، وعملية التبرير التي قامت بها، ثم نحلل المعضلات التي واجهت إعلان هذه الجماعات القبول بالديمقراطية.

At the beginning, Arab popular revolutions surprised Salafi movements and trends (deployed in various parts of the Arab region) just as they surprised Arab regimes. Salafis were generally not ready or expecting to face such a shift where stakes are radically changed, after they had convinced themselves for centuries at the ideological and jurisprudential level that regimes always prevail and that no peaceful democratic change can happen in our world. For that reason, the majority of Salafi currents hadn't envisioned this moment even as a theoretical option.

In this paper we will try to focus on the peaceful Salafi currents (while excluding the Salafi Jihadis), both those that believed in political action before 2011, but had not announced their acceptance of democracy explicitly, and those that had remained away from politics or considered political engagement as useless. We will try to look into the ideological changes that those groups and trends have gone through, and examine how they have justified such changes. We will finally analyse the dilemmas they faced following their endorsement of democracy.

**Ismail ALEXANDRANI**

## ***Sinai with and without the Brothers: Did it matter?***

Chronologically, there is a clear bond between the ouster of President Muhammad Mursi and the rise of the newly ISIL affiliate group 'Sinai Province' (formerly named Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis). However, some analysts cast doubts on the relationship between the coup and the terrorist attacks in Sinai comparing it with Tunisia which has witnessed unprecedented operations without a similar political-military path. Those arguments shed lights on the irritated, sometimes hostile, relationship between the Muslim Brothers and Salafi Jihadists.

This paper seeks to question an alternative scenario in Sinai assuming that Mursi is still in office. No accurate prediction might be close to this alternative fictional reality especially when variables are too many and too changeable to control or direct. The alternative scenario aims to deepen the understanding of the dynamic relations between political Islamists and their Jihadist counterparts. More important, it is to examine the exclusive relation between potential reconciliation and security progress.

Based on ethnographic and sociological field research for three years in the Sinai Peninsula, I attempt to present an insider view of the socio-cultural rift between the urban and semi-urban political Islamists on one side, and the mostly Bedouin Jihadists on the other side. This case study does not aim to generalize but, indeed, to emphasize the particularity of Sinai both socially and geo-strategically. The main question of this paper is how different the Jihadist path would be in Sinai if Mursi had completed his presidential period, and what role the local sociopolitical factors and the regional updates would have independently played from the coup.

## Loulouwa AL-RACHID

### *The disarray of Iraqi sunnism*

Iraqi Sunnis seem to have lost irremediably a national order granting them political supremacy over the Shia's and the Kurds, as well as a regional order defending them against Iran and its local allies. Since the American invasion of 2003 and the subsequent replacement of Saddam Hussein by an ethno-sectarian regime dominated by the Shi'a majority, Sunnis feel, indeed, dispossessed of their sense of belonging to Iraq. Baghdad is no longer their political, cultural and religious capital; their geographic « triangle » to the west and north of the country gradually broke away from the rest of Iraq. It is now governed by a new revolutionary entity, the so-called Islamic State (IS) whose Jihadi-Salafists are forcing the « old » Sunni classes (Ba'athists, Islamists, tribal and urban notables, and ulamas) to redefine and negotiate Sunni identity and political future among themselves as well as with the central government. This paper will map out the wide Sunni political landscape from rejectionists to collaborationists. It will explore the Iraqi Sunni path to radicalization since 2003, in particular, the counter-«sectarianization » dynamic and drift toward separatism, if not secession from the rest of Iraq.

## Abdulsalam AL-RUBAYDI

### *Ansar al-Sharia in South Yemen: Configuration, expansion and discourse (In Arabic)* أنصار الشريعة في جنوب اليمن: ظروف التكوين والتوسع وسمات الخطاب

بدأ تنظيم القاعدة في جنوب الجزيرة العربية في الظهور إلى العلن منذ تسعينيات القرن الماضي. وقد تشكل من قيادات عادت من أفغانستان ومن آخرين انظموا إلى التنظيم على أثر انهيار الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني وتمكن نظام علي عبد الله صالح من كل مقاليد البلاد بالقوة وبشراء الولاءات وبتبني خطاب ديني ضد المخالفين لنظامه. وقد ساعد صعود تنظيم القاعدة في هذه المنطقة من العالم عدد من العوامل منها الايديولوجي المرتبط بشيوع الخطاب الديني السلفي بعد العام ١٩٩٤، مع وجود فراغ روحي خلفته الحقبة الاشتراكية؛ ومنها الجغرافي المرتبط بطبيعة المنطقة من حيث غياب الدولة في بعض المناطق وتوفر الجبال الشاهقة والمناطق الوعرة التي تحول دون الوصول إلى هذه الملاذات الآمنة لتنظيمات من هذا النوع؛ ومنها الاقتصادي بعد تخلي الدولة عن أدوارها التنموية والاجتماعية في مناطق الهامش لاسيما الجنوب، إضافة إلى العامل السياسي المتمثل في حرمان الدولة لقطعات سكانية معينة كالجنوب والوسط من حق التمثيل والمشاركة السياسية الحقيقية والفاعلة في كل المستويات.

ويعد العالم ٢٠١١، وهو عام الثورات العربية، من الأعوام الفارقة في تاريخ الجماعات المسلحة في اليمن. فهو العام الذي شهد بدايات توسع حركة «أنصار الله» الحوثية الشيعية في الشمال وفق برنامج محدد يقوم على إسقاط المناطق عسكريا مع الحفاظ على الحضور في فضاء الجدل السياسي. وعلى نحو شبيه من ذلك، بدأ تنظيم القاعدة الذي عُرف بـ «أنصار الشريعة» في التوسع في الجنوب في ظل صراع مرير مع السلطة وتحت ضربات الطائرات الأمريكية ولا سيما منذ العام ٢٠١٢ وما بعده. لقد استغل التنظيم توسع حركة الحوثيين من أجل كسب الاتباع في المناطق السنية الشافعية الذين يرون في الحركة الشيعية القادمة من الشمال خطرا حقيقيا يهددهم. ومع أن كثيرا من أبناء الجنوب ظلوا حريصين على الانضواء تحت سقف الحراك الجنوبي السلمي المدني الذي أنشأته قيادات عسكرية ومدنية جنوبية، إلا أن بعضا من سكان المناطق الوسطى والجنوبية والشرقية بالإضافة إلى بعض القادمين من شمال اليمن قد التحقوا بالتنظيم إثر تزايد الضربات الأمريكية وإثر تغاضي نظام مابعد ٢٠١١ عن توسع حركة الزيدو الحوثيين خارج معقلهم الشمالي بمحافظة صعدة.

لقد تبني التنظيم خطابا يمتدح أدلته من المدونة الجهادية التراثية بالإضافة إلى تضمينه بعض الإشارات المحلية الخاصة المتعلقة بمظلومية أجزاء معينة من البلد بفعل «تأمر» الداخل والخارج. وهو ما يعني أن خطاب التنظيم قد تطور نوعا ما ليتعرض لبعض اهتمامات السكان المحليين الأتية ومعاناتهم الاقتصادية والسياسية.

تتناول هذه الورقة مراحل تطور التنظيم مع ملاساتها الاجتماعية والسياسية بالإضافة إلى سمات خطابه الديني والسياسي الذي تطور نوعيا منذ العام ٢٠١١ وفقا لمقتضيات اللحظة التاريخية ولتكتشفات الفرصة السياسية السانحة.

Al-Qaeda emerged in the south of the Arabian Peninsula in the 1990s. It formed after the return of leaders from Afghanistan and around other individuals who joined the organization in the wake of the collapse of the Yemeni Socialist Party. It was also encouraged by the fact the regime of Ali Abdallah Salih started holding all the levers of power by force and was seeking to buy off loyalties and develop a religious discourse against its adversaries. The rise of al-Qaeda in this region of the world was triggered by various dynamics including the spread of a Salafi religious discourse after 1994, a spiritual crisis caused by socialism, the absence of the state in a number of remote regions, economic backwardness and the ill-representation of southern and central populations.

The year of Arab revolutions, 2011, played an important role for armed groups in Yemen. This is when the Huthi group, alias Ansar Allah, started to grow in North Yemen through a plan that let them expand militarily while remaining active politically. A similar method was adopted by al-Qaeda, also known as Ansar al-Sharia, to expand in the South following intense fighting with the regime and in the context of American drone strikes. Since 2012 in particular, the organization grew stronger by exploiting the fear of many in Sunni regions of seeing the Shia Huthis gain prominence and eventually start threatening them. Such development of al-Qaeda in this part of Yemen occurred despite the fact many in the South were remaining loyal to the civil Southern pacific movement (*al-hirak al-janubi*). In addition to Southerners, certain people who originate from all over the country joined the organization in the wake of intensified American strikes and following the weakening of the State in 2011 and the expansion of the Huthis outside of their Saada territory.

The jihadi organization adopted a discourse that finds its source in a traditional corpus but also refers to local specific cases of oppression that find their roots both internally and externally. The organization has thus expanded by referring to economic and political grievances. This paper focuses on the development of the organization at the social and political levels. It also looks into the way the religious and political discourse has evolved after 2011 in the framework of a new context and specific opportunities.

**Myriam BENRAAD**

### ***Iraqi Muslim Brothers: Between the Islamic State and a hard place***

In 2011, the uprisings that swept through the Arab world created as much surprise as enthusiasm among the Iraqis, who started to dream of a political rupture in their own country and took to the streets to protest against the authorities. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose experience had thus far been relatively disappointing in Iraq after the fall of the Baath Party in 2003, saw in this revolutionary wave the possibility of a conquest of power.

In view of these dramatic events, Iraq set both a precedent and an exception. A precedent since it is partly in Iraq that the tumultuous transition still shaking North Africa and the Middle East opened up in April 2003. An exception because this profound change did not occur through revolution but outside military intervention. Once “extracted” from tyranny, Iraq descended into chaos, becoming a counter-model for a majority of revolutionaries; admittedly, the legacy of the occupation has weighed heavily in the equation. Anterior and singular, the Iraqi transition is by no means similar to that of other countries in the region. By its ambivalence and multiple setbacks, it yet prefigured the state of violence, social tension and authoritarian resurgence that manifests itself today.

Little studied, the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq is emblematic of this dialectic of divergence and convergence. While their peers experienced their first political successes in neighboring countries, the Iraqi Brothers disappeared from the spectrum. Their main arm, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), not only lost the elections of 2010, but its leaders were hunted down by Baghdad. Sunni vice-president and Muslim Brother Tariq al-Hashimi fled to escape an arrest warrant that former Shi'i Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued against him. Indeed, al-Maliki feared the rise of Sunni Islamism and attempted, through various means, to thwart the Brothers' strategy. More generally, Baghdad looked with anguish at the Brotherhood's regional breakthrough, likely to reinvigorate Sunni Arabs in Iraq.

From 2012 onwards, the IIP tried to regain control, essentially drawing from Sunni anger. The Brothers took the lead of the protests that broke out in the main Sunni provinces, alongside the tribes and citizens claiming equal rights. However, al-Maliki responded violently to the revolt, which then became further radicalized. Overall, the Brothers failed to impose themselves, either by way of political participation or popular mobilization. As a consequence, they left the way open to renewed authoritarianism in Iraq, on the one hand, and terror spread by the Islamic State on the other.

**Laurent BONNEFOY**

***Islahis, Salafis, Huthis: Reconfigurations of the Islamist field in war-torn Yemen***

Popular mobilizations of the “Yemeni Spring” in 2011 had favored a broad convergence of interests within the Islamist field. The ouster of President Saleh appeared to be an objective that was widely shared by its various components. Huthis, Islahis, Jihadis and most Salafis had rallied behind the popular motto of the so-called “Revolutionary youth”. The transition period, in particular in the framework of the National Dialogue conference, changed the equilibrium and triggered new tensions. The emergence of a new actor, the Salafi Rashad Party, also played a significant part. The rise to power of the Islah party (and through it of the Muslim Brothers) generated new alliances and established the Huthi movement, stemming from the Zaydi segment of society, in the forefront and as a possible alternative to al-Islah and as its grand rival. The launch of the Saudi-led military offensive against the Huthis in late March 2015 only reinforced a deep reconfiguration of the Islamist field along largely sectarian lines. This presentation will look into the effects of this Sunni/Shia fault line and how it is restructuring Islamism in Yemen and its role in society and politics.

**Amel BOUBEKEUR**

***Algerian Islamists and Salafis after the Arab Spring: Eroding or reloading the regime?***

In 1999, the appointment of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as a “civilian” president by the Army was supposed to resolve the problem of representativity of a putshist military regime and close any further negotiation with the outlawed Islamists of the FIS. Throughout the 2000s, the launching of reconciliatory policies with armed Islamic groups, the economic reintegration of Salafis and the cooptation of legalized Islamist parties indeed succeeded in introducing a consensus on those actors dropping any demands for regime change. Since 2012 however, and in the context of an uncertain succession to President Bouteflika, Algerian Islamists and Salafis are repositioning themselves.

This paper will explain why Algerian Islamists are now using double-track strategies of political negotiation towards both the State and their grassroots, boycotting the elections and joining social protests while maintaining close contacts with security forces. Analyzing the Algerian Islamist experience will demonstrate how the successive sequences of electoral victories, repression, cooptation and internal dissent can alter the meaning of both political Islam and authoritarian governance.

**François BURGAT**

***From Ghannouchi to al-Baghdadi: The ubiquitous diversity of the Islamic lexicon***

Since the launch of the “Arab spring” in 2011, or, in particular, since the counter-revolutionary Egyptian coup in July 2013, how has the practice of the Islamic lexicon evolved in politics?

Now, near the end of 2015, «With or without the Brothers», Islamists in MENA appear in extremely diverse positions. In Tunis they are part of a compliant minority within a national unity government. In Egypt or the UAE, they may be in jail, under torture, on the roads of exile or, in some measure, supporting the new dictatorship. In Syria, they may be part of armed militias mobilized to defend an authoritarian regime, or conversely, struggling to topple that same regime by imposed terror as the head of a quasi « Islamic State ».

The statuses of Islamists stretch more than ever between the two extremes of the political field. Whether as full-fledged actors of national politics - like in the under researched case of Libya - or merely as part of the diplomatic tool box of several regimes’ strategies.

In MENA’s 2015 political landscape, five years after the advent of the 2011 “Spring” , from the very conciliatory strategies of Rashed Ghannouchi to the most violent provocations of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, nothing allows better to account for the centrality of the Islamists than the reference to their « ubiquitous diversity ».

***Hizbullah and Muslims Brothers: A political rupture or a contract renegotiation?***

Since the early 80's, the relationship between a nascent Hizbullah, galvanized by the Iranian Revolution, and the Muslim Brothers – whether Palestinians, Lebanese, Egyptian or Tunisian- is not straightforward. Nevertheless, the confessional, doctrinal and ideological discrepancies between them at this time are dwindled by some common political affinities, particularly around the Palestinian question – the military and political collaboration between Hizbullah and Hamas begins at the beginning of the first Intifada, in December 1987.

The second half of the 2000's is probably a turning point : the Lebanese Brothers, harshly opposed to the Syrian tutelage, are part of the 14 March Coalition, while a minority of the Brotherhood, led by Sheikh Fathi Yakan, still pledges its allegiance to Hizbullah. The Syrian uprising of 2011 and the military involvement of Hizbullah on the Syrian battlefield have clearly made the relations more difficult between the “Party of God” and the different movements claiming the Brotherhood tradition.

However, the process of breaking up between Hizbullah and the Muslim Brothers is relative: maybe it is only a contract renegotiation. Despite its disagreements with Hamas around the Syrian question, Hizbullah maintains its military support to the Palestinian movement. Hassan Nasrallah's organization criticizes the Egyptian Muslim Brothers for their links with Qatar: yet, it does not support the new regime of General Sisi. During the summer 2015, at the occasion of the Ramadan month, the number of meetings between the Lebanese Muslim Brothers – the Jama'a al-islamiya- and the Shia formation has also increased – leading to a difficult debate inside the Brotherhood. The dialogue between Muslim Brothers in the region and Hizbullah is continuous, but at the same time critical, suspicious and distant. It reflects above all a certain pragmatism of both parties: they certainly do not want to be enclosed in exclusive regional alliances. Muslim Brothers are conscious that Hizbullah remains an important and inescapable regional interlocutor – that is to say not only Lebanese. From Hizbullah's perspective, a definitive breakdown with the different tendencies of the Muslim Brothers also means to lose any support, in the next future, in some significant part of the Sunni Arab world. To both, the logic of confessional polarization is not definitive: but for how much longer?





**Tine GADE**

### ***Sunnism in Lebanon after the Syrian war***

This presentation analyses Sunni-Shi'i relations and the spillovers of the state deconstruction in Syria and Iraq into Lebanon. In the wake of the Syrian war, new linkages have developed between Lebanese and Syrian Islamist networks. Lebanese Sunni Salafis as well as fighters from Shi'i Hezbollah are present in Syria. The two camps have opposed each other directly in battle in al-Qussayr (near the northern border) and in al-Qalamoun (near the border in the Beqa'a valley), where both actors were heavily involved. How has the "Somalization" of Syria and Iraq (Hinnebusch 2014) affected Sunni-Shi'i relations in Lebanon? This has led to the reconfiguration of Lebanese Salafism. Moreover, the Syrian war and Hezbollah's involvement have been responsible for the growing alienation many Lebanese Sunnis today feel vis-à-vis their own army.

The first part of the presentation will argue that Lebanese youths who support Da'esh at the sentimental level, and even those who travel to Syria to fight, rarely wish Da'esh to come to Lebanon. Salafis in Lebanon generally do not wish to create an Islamic state in Lebanon. Adopting the Salafi *manhaj* is a way to make a statement about Sunni identity and oppose political Shi'ism and Hezbollah. The territorial conquests of Jabhat al-Nusra and Da'esh in neighbouring Syria, did not essentially change these dynamics.

At the same time, large segments of the Sunnis have in recent years become alienated by the army command, which they perceive as subservient to Hezbollah. This is the topic of the second part of the presentation. Islamist groups affiliated with Salafi armed groups in Syria have clashed with the army in several localities, Saida, Aarsal, and Tripoli in 2013 and 2014. This becomes delicate because the army rank-and-file consists of a majority (approximately 40%) of Sunnis, who serve in the army for livelihood purposes. Hariri's support to the army has been crucial to maintain its unity, but this position is challenged. During crises, Salafis and populist Sunni leaders have called on Sunnis to desert from the army. The challenges of the army are also linked to the 27 kidnapped Lebanese soldiers and policemen held by Da'esh and al-Nusra Front in Syria, a difficult issue, which, in the worst case, could release a Sunni-Shi'i war in Lebanon.

**Sari HANAFI**

### ***Transnational movement of Islamic reform: New configurations***

For longtime social movements theories have been interested in explaining the rise and the growth of violence within some social movements. While some are very interested in the internal ingredients (ideology, demographic background, socio-economic status, poverty) (Touraine 1981; Ismail 2006), other are more interested in exogenous factors and political opportunity structure of (routinized violent practices against civilians, torture and humiliation, indiscriminate state repression, closing up of the political space) (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) in this line, echoing Hanna Arendt (1969) according to whom "No doubt, this development [of violence] has a logic of its own, but it is a logic that springs from experience and not from a development of ideas", Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) spouse with strong arguments on how some Islamists in the region (and particularly Egypt in 70s onward) have adopted violent contention as a result primarily of indiscriminate state repression and the closing up of the political space. While there is an emerging body of literature on the structural conditions that drove the forces of these revolutions, much of it requires combination with other perspectives so that the analysis is sufficiently robust to explain a fuller range of these complex and ongoing events. In this project, I consider the violence contestation as the result of a combination of three factors:

- State violence and closing up of the political space
- Ethic/sectarian framing through the reactivation of some radical interpretations of religious corpus
- socio-economic deprivation

The role of the social research is not to enumerate factors but to show what is the salient factor in a given

situation that can explain with the help of other factors the rise or the growth of certain mode of action, including ebbs and flows in the level of violence. In order to add some flesh to the bare-bones analytical argument, this proposal contends that in the post-Arab uprisings era, the recourse of some Islamic groups to violent contestation is due to the saliency of the context of state violence and closing up of the political space. However, a reactivation of some radical interpretations of religious corpus, through Friday sermons, mass media and social media become very important factor to frame ethnicity/sectarianism and to facilitate the ideology of violence and to explain strategic and tactical choices of the actors. I employ the word “reactivation” as it goes against any essentialization of religion or ideology. The political use of Islamic glossary (*lexique*) (Burgat 2014) is a very mobilizing factor but is in constant metamorphosis. By that, we inscribe in analytical sociology that specify the set of explicative mechanisms that are likely to have brought about the change (Hedström and Bearman 2009) and refuse to think in terms of groupism with which we tend to label some islamist groups and add a hard adjective such as terrorist or violent. By following thus Rogers Brubaker (2002), we adopt alternative conceptual strategies that focus on practical categories, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events.

**Stéphane LACROIX**

### ***Being Salafi under Sisi: Examining the post-coup strategy of the al-Nour party***

On 3 July 2013, Mohamed Mursi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s guidance bureau and the first democratically elected president of Egypt, was overthrown by a military coup led by General (now Field Marshall) Abdelfattah al-Sisi. Since then, the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated a terrorist organization and brutally repressed. In contrast, the Salafi al-Nour party, the political arm of the “Salafi Call” (*al-da’wa al-salafiyya*), has supported Mursi’s overthrow, taken part in the writing of a new constitution and supported Sisi in the May 2014 presidential elections. How can we account for al-Nour’s political strategy? What role does the party play in the emerging power structure in Egypt? And what does this tell us about al-Nour’s political identity?

**Brynjar LIA**

### ***The jihadi movement and rebel governance: A reassertion of a patriarchal order?***

The so-called “Islamic State” (IS), an al-Qaeda offshoot group which has conquered substantial parts of northern Syria and Western Iraq has drawn attention to the question of jihadism and rebel governance. While a range of issues can be raised with regards to jihadi rebel governance, my primary interest in this paper is to answer the following questions: What characterizes jihadi proto-states in terms of patriarchal norms and practices? To what extent is it meaningful to describe and analyze jihadi proto-states as patriarchal state constructs? The question of what characterizes jihadi proto-states with regards to patriarchal norms and a patriarchal system of governance may seem relatively straight forward.

Movements like IS, Taliban, Boko Haram, and Shabaab are often considered as ultra-fundamentalist movements whose practices feature the worst aspects of patriarchal society. The list of violations of women’s rights by these movements is endless, including female slavery, rape and forced marriages.

Taliban’s banning of female education, Boko Haram’s kidnapping of school girls to the practice of female slavery in territories controlled by the so-called Islamic State (IS) seem to confirm the notion that whenever jihadi insurgents conquer territory, they rush to establish a highly patriarchal order, making women subservient and invisible. The scholarly literature also tends to dismiss militant Islamist movements as patriarchal ultra-masculinist groups.

This black-and-white image of the jihadi movement and patriarchy clearly has some merits. There is no denying that women have been treated unequally to men in the various jihadi-controlled enclaves, and

that gruesome abuses have been perpetrated against women in conflict areas where jihadi movements are dominant. The grotesque nature of some of these abuses and atrocities are such that any academic attempt at adding nuances may be perceived as morally inappropriate. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of jihadi violence against women in conflict areas, the idea that jihadi proto-states are the ultimate expression of an oppressive patriarchal order need to be qualified.

Our ability to understand the causes which facilitate the rise and proliferation of jihadi groups will remain limited if we simply dismiss them as yet another manifestation of patriarchy in Arab Muslim societies.

This paper argues that the social and political order established in jihadi proto-states are in contradiction with patriarchal norms and practices on several key accounts. First, jihadi proto-states are intensely ideological projects, in which blood ties and kinship play a minimal role. This aspect is perhaps most visible in the participation of foreign fighters or foreign volunteers, who are usually young men and women with no kinship ties with the population in the jihadi proto-state to which they travel. These foreign Muslim volunteers often sever their kinship ties in defiance of their fathers (their nominal patriarchs) to join a new social, political and ideological community. Arriving in the jihadi-ruled territory, they recreate a society which may outwardly have many of the trappings of a patriarchal order in the sense that women are mostly allowed to occupy a role in the private sphere, as house wife and mother, but usually not as a fighter.

In the case of IS, which is the primary case study for this paper, the group seeks to create an intensely religious-ideological community in which all relations are tightly measured against ideological dictates. This is also highly regulated, bureaucratized society, which is not ruled at the discretion of the patriarchs, i.e. shaykhs and heads of tribes. As I shall discuss in this presentation, jihadi proto-states are run by young armed men while the traditional power-holders in patriarchal societies – elderly men and tribal shaykhs – are relegated to the role of bystanders, subjects or propaganda mascots. In fact, the tribal shaykhs are being publicly humiliated and are being forced to pay oaths of allegiance to the commander of ISIS, the so-called “Caliph Ibrahim”.

Young women also take part in a variety of roles in the IS “Caliphate” or what is also termed the “Islamic Revival”-project. These roles are all prescribed in detailed by the jihadi movements’ ideologues. Far from being a helpless victim in a patriarchal world, the female jihadis take an active role in shaping the movement. Despite their low-profile role, they seem to demonstrate a degree of “agency” (if such a term is applicable in this context) and participate in the various spheres of activity, including in propaganda outreach, recruitment, education, policing, guard duties, etc.

Young women employed by ISIS also administer physical punishments on women, often elder than themselves, for violating the religious laws of the proto-state.



**Marc LYNCH**

### ***Evolving transnational networks and media strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood***

This paper will examine how the dramatic shifts in the regional politics of the Middle East over the last few years has affected the transnational networks and media strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood. The intense repression of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the crackdown across the Gulf has obviously changed the organizational structure and strategies of those groups. The permutations of wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen and the rising appeal of ISIS has put other pressures on the Brotherhood. This paper will discuss the Muslim Brotherhood in a regional rather than national context. In addition to interview and published source materials, it will draw on network analysis of a unique Twitter dataset to map out the shifting relationships and discourse of a wide array of Islamists in the years since 2011.

**Monica MARKS,**

### ***Survivalist club or dynamic movement? Generational politics in Ennahda today***

The “twin shocks” of rising Salafi jihadi trends in Tunisia and region-wide backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood following the July, 2013 ouster of former Egyptian president Mohamed Mursi narrowed Ennahda’s range of political manoeuvre. This effect was particularly pronounced on issues related to revolutionary justice, such as the proposed electoral exclusion (i.e. lustration law), floated between 2012 and 2014, which Ennahda and its coalition partners had edged extremely close to passing.

The paper considers the micro-political, internal effects that this series of sometimes survivalist compromises has had on Ennahda internally, particularly regarding young people who are either card-carrying party members, or who campaigned for or strongly sympathized with Ennahda in either the 2011 or 2014 elections. In this paper, I will explore the effects that Ennahda’s political compromises have had on the party internally by focusing on the reactions to these compromises amongst Nahdawi and Nahdawi-sympathizing youth, as well as the party leadership’s efforts to keep young people on board the party, and to reach out to more religiously conservative (sometimes Salafi oriented) or revolutionary-motivated young people who have resented such compromises. The party’s leadership has long articulated a need to explain its compromises – both political and religious – to young people more effectively, perhaps revising its educational program and the structure and outreach activities of its youth wing to foster more understanding of Ennahda’s compromises and underlying religious and political rationales.

The paper argues that Ennahda’s efforts to rethink Islamism as a local and long-termist project (*al-siyasa al-intiqaliya*, or transitional politics) predicated on canny compromise, a malleable message of cultural conservatism, and the survival of a democratic (if not necessarily secular-liberal) political system has not translated fully to its base, particularly to young people, who have clung more tightly to the ideal of a more just, and perhaps more publicly pious, political system. The future of Ennahda in Tunisia rests, in part, on whether the party can recast Islamism in process-dependent, defensive terms while also appealing to young people as a principled movement.

Drawing from hundreds of interviews conducted with Ennahda youths and leaders from 2011 – 2015, this paper will explain the primary ways in which Ennahda has tried to reach out to young people since the revolution. It will also detail the main ways in which young people within the movement (or sympathetic to it) have responded based on socio-economic and regional background, their families’ histories of involvement in the movement, etc. In so doing, the paper will explore a small but fascinating sliver of how Ennahda is responding to its constricted margin of maneuver internally, particularly in terms of party expansion and generational relations.

**Rory McCARTHY**

### ***When Islamists lose an election***

Tunisia's Islamist movement Ennahdha campaigned hard to win the legislative elections in October 2014, presenting itself as a non-ideological movement more focused on security and economic prosperity than Islamisation. Its defeat prompted frustration within its ranks and has triggered a difficult internal debate about the movement's identity and a reassessment of what it means to be Islamist in the new context of the Arab Spring.

This paper takes a micro-level look at Ennahdha's mobilisation and election campaigning in the city of Sousse, to assess how the movement presented itself to the electorate and how it tried, in vain, to steer the debate away from identity politics. This paper then explores how local level movement members and leaders chose candidates, prepared and organised the campaign. It explains how they reacted to electoral defeat and to the party leadership's decision to remain neutral in the presidential campaign and participate in a ruling coalition with its erstwhile rival Nidaa Tounes. The paper examines the current debate about how the movement should reconcile an elite-level civil political programme, with refrains from proposing sharia law, with its historic grassroots Islamisation project. The movement is now considering whether to remain both political party and religious social movement or to split into two separate elements, a decision between 'joining or splitting' (*al-wasal aw al-fasl*).

My broader DPhil research is based on 14 months of fieldwork in Sousse, spent interviewing Ennahdha activists and following their activities. Though often considered a centre of the secular middle class, Sousse has had a significant Islamist community since the 1980s. This paper particularly focuses on the period of the election campaign, when I attended Ennahdha rallies and meetings and accompanied activists as they went campaigning door-to-door. It also draws on interviews conducted in the weeks and months after the election results.

**Yahya MICHOT,**

### ***bn Taymiyya in 'Dabiq'***

Between July 2014 and September 2015, eleven issues of *Dabiq*, the Islamic State's propaganda magazine were uploaded on the Internet in English language. Ibn Taymiyya is one among the classical Muslim authorities quoted and, if I am not mistaken, is mentioned 55 times. In 33 cases, excerpts from his publications are translated, at times without proper referencing. For the matter of this paper, the Arabic version of these 33 quotes has been identified. Six are extracts of *al-Fatāwā l-Kubrā*, *al-Istiqāma*, *Jāmi' al-Masā'il*, *Minhāj al-Sunna*, *al-Nubuwwāt* and *al-Şārim al-Maslūl* ; others are excerpts of *Majmū' al-fatāwā*, including 18 of volume xxviii, which deals with jihād. Furthermore, half of these 18 quotes are excerpts of the famous three anti-mongol fatwas. Analysis of these documents highlights a number of, at times surprising, features. Building on a set of examples, this paper will try to describe the type of understanding of Ibn Taymiyya that appears to be dominant in the studied corpus.



**Thomas PIERRET**

***Farewell to the vanguard: Syria's Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement and wartime de-radicalisation***

The largest Syrian rebel faction, Ahrar al-Sham was founded in early 2012 by Jihadi militants who had been released the previous year from the prison of Seydnaya. From the onset, the movement engaged in a process of de-radicalisation that set it apart from Jihadi groups like the Nusra Front in terms of relationship with the mainstream opposition, with regional states, and with the goals of the 2011 uprising. Ahrar al-Sham's de-radicalisation did not occur in spite of the civil war, but rather because of the latter. Building upon past failures in Iraq, and faced with the unprecedented phenomenon of a wide-scale armed popular mobilisation, the group's founders operated a critical revisions of Jihadi precepts and embraced the definition of the war as part of a Syrian revolution, rather than as a mere episode of the global jihad. Although strong partnership with Qatar and Turkey undeniably played a role in that process of de-radicalisation, the failure of the same states at enticing the Nusra Front into following a similar route suggests that path dependency is crucial here, in the sense that the choices made by Ahrar al-Sham upon its foundation largely determined its later ideological development.

**Truls TONNESEN**

***The Iraqi origins of the "Islamic State"***

The historical origin of the group known as "the Islamic State" (IS) has been traced back to the Jordanian Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and his setting up a training camp for Arab foreign fighters in Herat, Afghanistan, at the turn of the century. Scholars and IS itself have described the establishment of an Islamic State as the fulfillment of Zarqawi's vision. True, it is some sort of historical continuity between Zarqawi's group and IS in its current incarnation. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group founded by Zarqawi in Iraq in 2004 was the leading faction behind the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006 together with several other Iraqi insurgent groups. In 2013 ISI became known as the Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria (ISIS), and from June 2014 as "the Islamic State" (IS).

On the other hand, there are some crucial differences between AQI and ISI/IS, especially since 2010 when almost the entire top echelon of ISI was eliminated and replaced with a new generation of leaders.

One important difference is that while several of AQI's founding fathers hailed from Iraq's neighboring countries, such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, after 2010 the leadership was dominated by Iraqis, with a few important exceptions. Another important difference is that while several of AQI's leaders were graduates from the training camps for foreign fighters in Afghanistan, especially from Zarqawi's own camp in Herat very few, if any of the leaders after 2010 had been in the mujahidin camps in Afghanistan. Instead, they were predominantly Iraqi veterans from the former Iraqi armed forces and some from the insurgent groups that was established in the wake of the collapse of the former Iraqi regime in 2003, and it was within this context and conflict they established their networks and was formed by. This is for instance relevant for understanding the poor relationship between IS and al-Qaeda Central as, in contrast to the founding fathers of AQI, very few, if any, of the top leaders of IS have met or knew bin Laden, Zawahiri or others of the top leaders of al-Qaeda. However, this paper argues that although AQI initially was established by non-Iraqis, various indigenous Iraqi networks have played a central role within the group right from its inception. For instance, like IS, several of AQI's founding fathers had been officers in the army of Saddam Hussein. This paper also argue that the increased salience of religion in Iraq during the 1990s, especially due to the sanction regime and the so-called Faith campaign (*al-hamla al-imaniyya*) had important effects on the Baath party itself, and also helps explain the rise, and to some extent also the agenda, of both AQI and IS.

As the original founders of AQI were killed, the Iraqi wing of AQI increased its influence, culminating in 2010 when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new head of the ISI. The establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra of in 2011, initially ISI's Syrian wing, further increased the Iraqi nature of ISI as several of ISI remaining non-Iraqi leaders seems to have joined Jabhat al-Nusra who in 2013 broke their ties with ISI(S). Most of the networks associated with AQI's Zarqawi seem to have joined or supported Jabhat al-Nusra, not IS. Thus, it may be argued that while IS to some extent is a continuation and expansion of AQI's Iraqi networks, Jabhat al-Nusra is a continuation of AQI's regional non-Iraqi networks.

Although IS has been joined by several thousand foreign fighters, the top leadership has so far remained in Iraqi hands. There are however some indications that this is about to change, and that some of the IS' foreign recruits have risen to leadership position within IS. How is a group like IS and its agenda, its relationship to other local actors and to local communities affected by the background of its leaders and whether the leaders of the groups are native to the country they are operating in or are foreigners?

**Bjørn Olav UTVIK**

### ***Myths of Ikhwan disaster: Anatomy of the 2011-2013 power struggle in Egypt***

How are we to understand the political struggle over the shape and content of the reformed post-Mubarak state that took place during the period of relative free debate and tentative steps towards a democratic system, from 11 February 2011 till 3 July 2013? In light of the deepening polarisation between the Muslim Brothers (MB) and the more secular political tendencies that characterised the period, it is common to portray the conflict as being between a project of Islamisation and a secularist agenda. To what extent does this hold true?


In this paper I argue a) that what took place was rather a power struggle involving competing elites as well as what is sometimes termed the "deep state", i.e. the entrenched power holders from Mubarak's time, especially in the military, the police and the judiciary, b) the understanding of what shaped the road towards Sisi's coup is clouded by a number of unsubstantiated myths about the actions of the Muslim Brothers during the transitional period, c) the very real problems related to MB performance in the transitional period are of a different nature than the way it is usually portrayed and d) to the extent that issues of secularisation was at stake, in important aspects Islamists turned out to be if anything more secularising than their secularist competitors.

The paper offers nothing near a full treatment of the transitional period. Neither is it a formal study of constitutional issues, though it dwells on some important aspects of the new constitution finalised in 2012. My primary interest here is what the struggle over the new constitution, and more broadly over the path to be followed in the transition process, can tell us about the main forces at work at the heart of the intense political conflict that developed.

**Marie VANNETZEL**

### ***#R4bia: The Paradoxical Dynamics of the Pro-Mursi Mobilizations in Turkey***

In the aftermath of the massacre of the Pro-Mursi sit-inners of Rab'a al-Adawiyya square in Cairo, in August 2013, hundreds of Muslim Brothers – or people "considered" as such by the Egyptian security forces – fled their country to escape repression. Many of them chose to set up in Turkey, as then Prime Minister Erdogan had promptly denounced the massacre, displaying what was to become the symbol of the pro-Mursi resistance: the four-fingers sign. At the same time, a powerful mobilization emerged in Turkey in support to Mursi and to the victims of the massacre, and diffused to several countries in the world, both through social media and street demonstrations. This paper will explore the genealogy of this mobilization and put forward two paradoxes: first, this seemingly transnational mobilization actually addressed internal Turkish issues, and second, it barely involved the Muslim Brothers in exile in Turkey. I will therefore question the vectors of the "Islamic solidarity" imaginary, the motivations of the "Islamist multi-organizational field" in Turkey and the logics of the Egyptian MB's demobilization in exile.



**Joas WAGEMAKERS**

***With or without the others: Consolidating divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (2013-2015)***

This presentation focuses on the internal divisions within the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and how these have been consolidated by the challenges presented by the “Arab Spring”. I argue that the revolutions in the Arab world, particularly Egypt and the victory of Brotherhood-candidate Muhammad Mursi, have inspired the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but have led to different conclusions being drawn from this. While some saw the revolutions as proof of the righteousness of their insistence on regime reforms as a condition for parliamentary participation, others saw the events in Egypt after Mursi’s disposal as proof that the Brotherhood’s interests are best served when they are part of the political system, not outside of it. This presentation gives an overview of the various divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and looks at how the “Arab Spring” has acted as a centrifuge in pushing the various points of view to the extremes.

**Dilek YANKAYA**

***A “transnational Islamic business network”? Rethinking the connections between Turkish, Egyptian and Tunisian “Islamic businessmen” after the Arab Springs***

Economic networks constitute an important dimension of the transnational dynamics at work in the recompositions of the post-2011 Middle East. Beside diaspora and migrant workers, a third category of actors should be taken into account when analyzing the upcoming transformation in states and societies in the aftermath of a revolutionary moment: the regional business actors who engage in transnational activism. This paper will focus on the constitutive role of Turkish so-called “Islamic businessmen”, gathered in the Association of Independent Businessmen and Industrialists (Müsiad), on the mobilization patterns of particular business groups in Arab countries. Studying the circulation process of Müsiad’s business representation model into Egypt and Tunisia the paper will address two major issues regarding both transnationalism literature and Middle Eastern studies. First, while the businessmen can be defined as a transnational economic actor, it also appears, in many aspects, as a “transnational advocacy group”, hence questioning the classical dichotomy between types of transnational activism. They seek to develop economically profitable links as well as to build an imagined political and cultural community defined as the “Muslim business community”. Secondly, the paper deals with the question of the identification processes which are supposed to bind together actors close to Islamist movements. The case of Müsiad’s “model exportation” to Namaa in Tunisia and Ebda in Egypt shows that these movements entertain divergent patterns of relationships with business communities and the State matter and that they may hinder the construction of such worldwide solidarity networks. In doing so, we argue that focusing on actions rather than previously defined actors provides more interesting insights about the complexities of transnational forms of Islamism.



**Ahmed ZAGHLUL**

***The nationalization of the religious sphere in Egypt (In Arabic)***

**تأميم المجال الديني في مصر**

رغم حرص النظام الحالي في فترة ما قبل الثالث من يوليو وما بعده على تأكيده على السعي نحو تجنب مصر مآلات الوقوع في فخ الدولة الدينية، إلا أن ممارساته التي أعقبت عزل الرئيس السابق محمد مرسي ماهي إلا سلسلة من المحاولات المستمرة للسيطرة على المجال الديني وإحكام قبضته عليه، بصورة يراها البعض تأسيساً لدولة دينية سلطوية جديدة. هذا التوجه في جوهره مؤشراً على أمرين: استمرارية الصراع التقليدي حول المجال الديني بين الدولة والإسلاميين. والثاني الأزمة السياسية التي تواجه النظام الحالي، وتدفعه نحو مزيد من الشمولية «الدينية»، كي يتمكن من تجاوز تجربة الإسلاميين ودولة مرسي، وهو مالم ينجح في تحقيقه إلى الآن.

Despite the keenness of the current regime both before and after the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2013 to proclaim its willingness to spare Egypt from the consequences of falling into the trap of a religious state, its practices that followed the deposition of former President Mohamed Morsi can be seen as a series of continuous attempts to control the religious sphere in a way that some may even consider as providing the conditions for the emergence of a new religious authoritarian state. This trend points at essentially two things. First, the continuation of the traditional conflict over the religious sphere between the state and the Islamists. Second, the political crisis facing the current regime, which drives it towards more « religious » hegemony in an attempt to erase the experience of Islamists and of the Mursi state – something it has not achieved until now.

## BIOGRAPHIES

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